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INTRODUCTION
Six years after Citizens United enabled unfettered spending in our elections, the use of so-called dark 
money has become disturbingly common. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s assumption that this 
unlimited spending would be transparent to voters, at the federal level powerful groups have since 
2010 poured hundreds of millions of dollars into influencing elections while obscuring the sources of 
their funding.1 
But it is at the state and local levels that secret spending is arguably at its most damaging. For a 
clear understanding of the degree to which dark money is warping American democracy, state ballot 
referenda and local school board contests may be a better starting point than the presidential campaign 
or even congressional races. As Chris Herstam, a former Republican majority whip in the Arizona 
House of Representatives and now lobbyist, put it, “In my 33 years in Arizona politics and government, 
dark money is the most corrupting influence I have seen.”2
This report documents how far outside spending — election spending that is not coordinated with 
candidates — at the state and local levels has veered from the vision of democratic transparency the 
Citizens United Court imagined, drawing on an extensive database of news accounts, interviews with 
a range of stakeholders, campaign finance and tax records, court cases, and social science research. For 
the first time, it also measures changes in dark money — and a thus far unrecognized rise in what we 
term “gray money” — at the state level, by analyzing spender and contributor reports in six of nine 
states where sufficient usable data were available.3 This set of six geographically and demographically 
diverse states, comprising Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Maine, and Massachusetts, represents 
approximately 20 percent of the nation’s population.  
Altogether this review revealed several striking trends: 
•	 Our first-of-its-kind analysis showed that, on average, only 29 percent of outside spending 
was fully transparent in 2014 in the states we examined, sharply down from 76 percent 
in 2006. 
•	 Dark	money	surged	in	these	states	by	38	times	on	average	between	2006	and	2014.
•	 State	 super	 PACs,	 which	 are	 legally	 required	 to	 disclose	 their	 donors	 and	 thus	
hold themselves out to be transparent, increasingly reported donations from 
nonprofit groups that are not, themselves, required to disclose their donors. 
Donations from dark groups to super PACs increased by 49 times in these 
states between 2006 and 2014, from less than $190,000 to over $9.2 million. 
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•	 In a troubling new phenomenon we’ve identified, “gray money” has ballooned to nearly 
60 percent of all outside spending in 2014, on average in the states we examined.
•	 Measuring	 dark	money	 alone	 understates	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 transparency	 problem.	
We found a sharp rise in what we term “gray money”: spending by state super PACs 
that reported other PACs as donors, making it impossible to identify original donors 
without sifting through multiple layers of PAC disclosures. 
•	 “Gray	money”	ballooned	from	15	percent	of	all	outside	spending	on	average	across	the	
six	states	in	2006	to	59	percent	of	all	outside	spending	by	2014.
•	 Dark money at the state and local levels frequently flows from special interests with a 
direct and immediate economic stake in the outcome of the contest in which they are 
spending, in contrast to what is often portrayed as the more broadly ideological outside 
spending  at the federal level. When uncovered, secret money at this level has traced back 
to such sources as a mining company targeting a state legislator who held a key role opposing 
quicker mining permits, payday lenders supporting an attorney general who promised to 
shield them from regulation, and food companies battling a ballot measure to add labeling 
requirements.4 
•	 Lower costs make it relatively easy for dark money to dominate state and local elections. 
For many of the contests we looked at, dark money groups outspent candidates themselves 
with amounts in the low $100,000s or even $10,000s — a modest business expense for special 
interests, but a major hurdle for many candidates and community groups.	5 At the federal level 
that degree of dominance can easily cost in the $10 millions.6
•	 Strong disclosure laws and enforcement can make a real difference. California, which saw 
many times more outside spending than any of the other states we examined, nevertheless saw 
a remarkably low amount of dark money in each cycle. It seems that the state’s exceptionally 
tough disclosure requirements and active enforcement culture have helped to keep secretive 
spending at a relative minimum.  
There are several reasons to be particularly concerned about the corrosive effects of dark and gray 
money at the state and local levels.  First, regulatory power at these levels is more concentrated, and 
more often subject to direct election, than at the federal level. From attorney general to comptroller 
to water district director, numerous state and local elected offices are capable of directly impacting 
special interests’ bottom lines. Also distinct from the federal level, voters in every state and innumerable 
counties and towns face ballot measures where they directly decide policy questions — education 
spending, collective bargaining, taxes — often with major financial consequences for a relatively small 
but economically powerful constituency.  
Second, these are often low-information elections, where it may not take much advertising to sway 
voters. This is particularly true in nonpartisan contests, such as ballot measure elections and many local 
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races, where voters do not have party affiliations as a signal.  In such cases, special interest spenders can 
hope to have a greater influence on voters than in high-profile elections featuring many voices.
Finally, lower costs make it relatively easy for dark and gray money to flood state and local elections 
with unaccountable messages. Entities with deceptively community-minded names — Californians for 
Good Schools and Good Jobs, shielding a Texas oil company; Proper Role of Government Education 
Association, shielding payday lenders — can invest relatively modest amounts but still saturate the 
airwaves and mailboxes.7 
How can this problem be fixed? One way would be to persuade the Supreme Court to overturn 
misguided decisions such as Citizens United, which empowered donors to funnel unlimited amounts 
of spending through opaque entities such as social welfare nonprofits and shell companies.  Short of 
that, this report offers a set of practical reforms to improve electoral transparency while protecting truly 
vulnerable speakers. Though reform at the federal level has stagnated because of inaction at the Federal 
Election Commission, Internal Revenue Service, and Congress, a number of states and cities have been 
more eager and able to respond to recent onslaughts of dark money.
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DARk AND GRAy MONEy ExpLAINED
In 2010, Citizens United set off a nationwide surge in outside spending — election advertising 
that is technically independent of candidates. But the Supreme Court didn’t say the sources 
of that spending could be secret. The justices assumed that existing rules and enforcement 
mechanisms would enable “prompt disclosure” of the interests behind the money.8
That assumption couldn’t be further from reality. The federal government has failed to enforce 
still-standing disclosure rules, let alone modernize those rules for the era of unlimited spending. 
The same is true in most states and cities. The result has been a rise in election spending by 
entities that do not publicly disclose their donors, commonly known as “dark money,” and also 
by entities that disclose donors in a way that makes the original sources of money difficult or 
perhaps impossible to identify, a type of spending this report terms “gray money.” We explain 
both phenomena below.
One major cause of dark money: disclosure rules overlook too many political advertisers. 
Non-profit organizations —	particularly	501(c)(4)	social	welfare	groups	and	501(c)(6)	trade	
associations — have become popular electioneering vehicles for donors seeking anonymity.9 
Unlike political action committees (PACs), which typically must disclose their donors 
publicly, these non-profit groups normally are required to make only nonpublic disclosures to 
the IRS.10 While technically politics is not supposed to be their primary purpose, in the absence 
of effective rules and enforcement these groups have been able to devote a huge share of their 
resources to politics.11   
The other major cause of dark money: disclosure rules also overlook too many political 
advertisements. Typically for ads that expressly urge voters to vote for or against a candidate, 
the identity of the spender and sometimes that of the funders must be disclosed.12 But when it 
comes to so-called “electioneering communications” — ads that attack or promote candidates 
in the guise of advocating about an issue — only 26 states require disclosure of the spender, let 
alone disclosure of the spender’s funders.13 
What causes gray money? Disclosure rules that overlook the true sources of funding. Super PACs 
— PACs that are supposed to advertise independent of candidates and, after Citizens United 
and related cases, can raise and spend unlimited sums — typically must disclose their donors.14 
But increasingly they have disclosed not individuals or businesses, whose interests are relatively 
apparent, but rather other PACs. That money might be traceable, through multiple layers of PAC 
disclosures, to an original source. But most people lack the time to dig this deeply, and, increasingly, 
understaffed newsrooms do, too. (Super PACs sometimes disclose nonprofits as donors. Because 
nonprofits generally do not have to disclose their donors, we consider PAC spending derived from 
such sources to be dark money, not gray.)   
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THE RISE OF DARk MONEy IN THE STATES FROM 2006 THROUGH 2014
The scores of news accounts, official investigations, and interviews we compiled and reviewed suggest 
that dark money is becoming a bigger problem in many states than at the federal level. Our analysis 
of outside spending in six states with sufficient usable data from before and after Citizens United 
confirmed this supposition.15 
In 2014, dark money was 38 times greater than in 2006, on average across the states we examined, 
while in federal elections it increased by 34 times over the same period.16 Between the increases in 
dark and gray money, we found that fully transparent outside spending — where regular voters may 
learn the true funder of an election ad by looking up the spender and possibly its donor reports — 
declined sharply, from 76 percent transparent in 2006 on average across the states we examined to 
just 29 percent transparent in 2014.
We reviewed outside spending in candidate elections in the 2006, 2010, and 2014 cycles in 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Maine, and Massachusetts. We anticipated that the January 
2010 Citizens United ruling, lifting limits on independent spending by unions and corporations 
including nonprofits, and an influential lower-court ruling that March, deregulating contributions 
to independent spenders, would affect outside spending trends beginning as soon as in the 2010 
cycle.17  We knew that these widely publicized changes in the law had also transformed the culture 
of outside spending, even in states where the technical effect on laws was not great.18 Moreover, even 
as outside spending and giving were suddenly free to climb, old disclosure loopholes, such as the 
exemption of groups who claim not to have a primarily political purpose, remained.19
The following charts and analyses summarize our findings, some expected and many striking.
I. 
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A.  State-Level Dark Money Surged
While dark money exploded at both the federal and state levels between 2006 and 2014, the rate of 
increase was greater on average across the states we examined than in federal elections. In the states, 
dark money in 2014 was 38 times greater than in 2006, while in federal elections it increased by 34 
times over the same period.20  
Changes in Dark Money in Six States, 2006-2014 
Trends in two outlier states are worth noting. Arizona saw by far the biggest surge in dark money, 
with	 the	amount	 in	2014	 rising	 to	295	 times	—	nearly	 three	hundred	 times	—	the	 level	 in	2006.	
By contrast, California saw remarkably little dark money over all cycles, especially considering the 
high levels of outside spending in the state. The major reason appears to be California’s decades-long 
requirement that even nonprofits, the typical vehicle for dark money, disclose donors for their election 
spending.21 Certain loopholes remained, but in 2014 the state enacted a measure to close one and likely 
reduce dark money even further in future elections.22 These unusually tough rules, along with the state’s 
robust enforcement culture, have enabled investigators and journalists to get to the bottom of many 
disclosure problems, which is why this report includes a disproportionately great number of incidents 
from California. 
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The overall rise in dark money partly reflects a spike in donations to super PAC spenders, which 
legally	must	disclose	their	donors,	from	nonprofit	donors	such	as	501(c)(4)	social	welfare	groups	and	
501(c)(6)	trade	associations	that	do	not	have	to	disclose	their	donors.	Dark	donations	to	technically	
transparent PACs increased by 49 times in the states we examined between 2006 and 2014, from less 
than $190,000 to more than $9.2 million.23
B.  “Gray Money” Also Ballooned
State super PAC spending based on donations from other PACs — spending we term “gray money” 
— also surged over the period we reviewed, meaning that voters seeking the original source of funding 
increasingly would have to investigate multiple layers of PAC disclosures.24	 In	2006,	25	percent	of	
contributions disclosed by such PACs came from other PACs, on average across the six states.25 By 
2014, 66 percent of contributions to such PACs on average came from other PACs. 
Changes in Gray Money in Six States, 2006-2014
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The amount of gray money increased dramatically in every state except California between 2006 and 
2014.	California	nevertheless	saw	a	significant	amount	of	gray	money	spent	in	each	cycle,	as	much	as	54	
percent of all outside spending in 2010.26 This trend reflects California’s unusual success in restricting dark 
money: For decades nearly all outside spenders have had to function as PACs that disclose their donors 
in relation to election spending.27 Though it may still be onerous for members of the public to examine 
multiple layers of PAC donors to determine the ultimate source of gray money, it is at least possible to do 
so, especially under recent reforms that require disclosure of at least some underlying donors.28 
Even with California’s gray money numbers holding relatively steady across the three election cycles, the 
increase in gray money’s share of all outside spending on average across the states was still stunning. Gray 
money	ballooned	from	15	percent	of	all	outside	spending	on	average	in	2006	to	59	percent	of	all	outside	
spending by 2014.29
C.  Fully Transparent Outside Spending Declined Dramatically 
The result of these rising trends in dark money and gray money has been a steep decline in the share of 
outside spending that, for a regular voter’s purposes, is effectively transparent: from 76 percent in 2006 
on average to just 29 percent in 2014 in the states we examined.
Changes in Fully Transparent Outside Spending in Six States, 2006-2014
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HOW DARk MONEy WORkS IN STATE AND LOCAL ELECTIONS
Dark money poses special dangers at the state and local levels. We examined dozens of instances 
where dark money in a state or local contest was linked, usually through shoe-leather reporting or 
official investigation, to a specific special interest. Three key trends emerged: (1) At these levels, dark 
money sources often harbor a narrow, direct economic interest in the contest’s outcome; (2) relatedly, 
contentious ballot measures that carry major economic consequences frequently attract dark money; 
and (3) in the relatively low-cost elections at these levels, it is easy for dark money to dominate with 
unaccountable messages that voters cannot meaningfully evaluate.
In Arizona, which at $10.3 million in 2014 had by far the greatest amount of dark money in any cycle 
of the states we examined, “politics have changed dramatically since Citizens United as a direct result 
of dark money,” according to Chris Herstam, currently a lobbyist who once served as Republican 
majority whip in the state House and as chief of staff to a Republican governor.30 
“In my 33 years in Arizona politics and government, dark money is the most corrupting influence 
I have seen,” he said, criticizing a recent move by the legislature to end state oversight of nonprofit 
groups’ political spending. He said that secretive special interest spending is making campaigning 
more costly, including in down-ticket contests, intimidating lawmakers from taking policy positions 
that might draw dark money attacks, and robbing voters of essential information. 
“Without adequate disclosure laws, Arizonans do not know for sure who is purchasing their elected 
offices. And we, the citizens, don’t have the proof to make it an issue and take a stand against it in 
any particular election,” he said. He argued that the effect of dark money is more profound on a 
smaller political scale: “While dark money gets a lot of national publicity, it is having a monstrous 
effect in Arizona.” 
A.  Dark Money Sources Often Hold Direct Economic Interests in the Election Outcome
Unlike many federal spenders who pursue broader or longer-term agendas, secretive special interests 
at the state and local levels often seek more immediate, direct benefits. In part, this focus reflects the 
fact that a great deal more regulatory power is up for election below the federal level. From statewide 
offices such as attorney general, secretary of state, and treasurer to seats on local utility boards, public 
hospital boards, and courts, a great deal of power over economic matters is subject to direct election 
where at the federal level it is up to presidential nomination and confirmation by the Senate. Forty-
three states elect an attorney general, a state’s top investigator and enforcer under laws banning 
fraud, environmental damage, employment discrimination, and a plethora of other business-relevant 
issues.31 Thirty-six states elect a comptroller or equivalent, the CFO of the state.32 Twelve states elect 
a commissioner of agriculture.33 One even elects its mine inspectors.34 Moreover, at the county and 
municipal levels, elections are frequently nonpartisan, leaving voters to depend especially heavily on 
other information about candidates, such as election ads.35
II. 
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One political consultant, who advises state campaigns across the South, pointed to places like Louisiana 
as ripe for hidden political spending. Several localities have sued oil and gas companies seeking money 
for coastal restoration. The fate of this litigation, or potential litigation, often hinges on the decisions 
of parish councils or commissions, local judges, or even a sheriff. 36 He expects to see dark money in 
these contests because “there are a set of local officials that are in position that directly affects oil and 
gas companies.”37 
Sometimes the interest can be even more parochial. Two billionaires secretly funded attack ads in a 
2012 Montana Supreme Court election that related to their long-litigated fight to keep locals from 
their waterfront estates, according to an investigation concluded last December by the state’s election 
authority.38 At the time of the election, voters saw only that Montana Growth Network, a nonprofit, 
was funding the ads.39   
Where weak disclosure rules allow special interests to buy influence through veiled election ads, these 
circumstances, at worst, risk corruption of the very officials meant to police those interests. More 
commonly, the lack of ad sponsor disclosure deprives voters of key information for evaluating messages. 
Our review of dozens of elections since 2010 showed how dark money has served specific economic 
ends in many state and local elections, unbeknownst to voters at the time. Some of the most striking 
instances include:
Payday Lenders and the Utah Attorney General 
At the egregious extreme is the confluence of economic incentives, unlimited outside spending, 
and absence of transparency laws that colored the campaign of successful 2012 Utah attorney 
general candidate John Swallow. With no incumbent running, the race was a real contest, 
though at the Republican primary stage in the solidly red state.40
More	 than	one	year	after	Swallow’s	victory,	and	nearly	$4	million,	165	witnesses,	 and	 tens	
of thousands of documents later, a state legislative committee determined that Swallow had 
“hung a veritable ‘for sale’ sign on the Office door that invited moneyed interests to seek special 
treatment and favors.”41 The committee’s 214-page report details how one industry, payday 
loan companies, worked with Swallow’s campaign to use a web of generically-named PACs 
and	nonprofits	to	obscure	approximately	$450,000	in	donations	for	nominally	independent	
election ads.42 The lenders sought Swallow’s protection from newly toughened consumer rights 
rules.43 His advisors asked the lenders to donate to dark money groups that would not disclose 
their donors rather than to his campaign in order not to “make this a payday race” funded by 
an industry often seen as preying on struggling families, according to the investigation.44
The biggest conduit for undisclosed lender support of Swallow was a nonprofit called the 
Proper Role of Government Education Association.45 Proper Role funneled money via other 
nonprofits to an out-of-state super PAC called It’s Now or Never, which then ran attack ads 
against Swallow’s primary opponent.46 At the time Swallow’s campaign manager denied any 
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connection to the attack ads, saying, “We’re actually really proud of the fact that we’ve been 
running a positive campaign from the very beginning.”47
Swallow handily won his party’s primary and the general election.48 Underscoring the 
special problem of corruption for elected offices such as the attorney general, the House 
Special Investigative Committee later wrote: “While the corruption of any public office 
is unacceptable, the corruption of the office specifically tasked with ensuring equal justice 
under law is particularly harmful because it undermines the public’s faith that justice in the 
State is being dispensed equally and without regard to economic, social or political status.”49
Swallow was later arrested on unrelated bribery charges, and resigned.50  The House committee 
turned over its findings to law enforcement authorities.51 Swallow pleaded not guilty to the 
bribery charges and as of May 2016 was awaiting trial.52
Mining and the Wisconsin State Senate 
An inadvertent court disclosure exposed how an out-of-state mining company in 2012 had 
secretly poured $700,000 into ads attacking Wisconsin legislators who opposed speeding 
up mine permits. The Florida-based business had bought mining options in Wisconsin’s 
Penokee Hills in 2010.53 Soon after, it began lobbying for a law to expedite environmental 
review of mining applications.54 The bill failed by one vote in the senate.55
State Senator Jessica King, who had cast a key vote against expediting, faced re-election in 
2012. The Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce Issues Mobilization Council, registered 
as a social welfare nonprofit, launched ads attacking King as a jobs-killer, including one 
that misrepresented as disapproving a union leader who actually supported King.56 The 
nonprofit received funding from another nonprofit, the Wisconsin Club for Growth, 
which in turn received the $700,000 from the Florida company, according to court filings 
in a separate matter first reported by ProPublica in 2014 — two years too late for voters.57 
King lost by less than 1 percent of the vote.58 Shortly after the election, in the next legislative 
session, King’s opponent cast the deciding vote in favor of the pro-mining legislation.59
The nonprofits involved have refused to disclose any details of their political spending 
including donor names.60 Indeed, they seem to exemplify the notion that anonymity in 
political advertising is power. One group told donors in 2012: “Last night conservatives 
flipped the state senate and grew our majority in the state assembly . . . . Thanks to your 
support, once again Wisconsin Club for Growth played a pivitol [sic] role in last nights 
[sic] results.”61 The other group’s website declares: “Unlimited corporate donations are 
allowed under law, and are held strictly confidential — we have never disclosed our 
donors, and never will.”62 
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Power Suppliers and Arizona’s Utilities Commission  
A shift in Arizona’s energy policy away from industry sources to homeowner-generated solar 
presaged an exponential surge of dark money in elections for the state’s five-member public 
utilities commission. Within a few years of the commission’s solar-friendly policy change 
in 2010, nearly half a million Arizonans had joined a program meant to reduce industry-
supplied power consumption by 22 percent.63
The 2014 election to replace two term-limited commissioners drew an astonishing $3.2 
million in dark money ads — more than double the combined spending, $1.2 million, of 
all	six	candidates	in	the	primary	and	general	elections,	and	almost	50	times	the	$67,000	in	
dark money spent in races for three commission seats in 2012.64 In 2008, before the solar 
policy, all outside spending in the commission races amounted to only $3,298, and none of 
it was dark.65
“It’s like a John Grisham-type setting because of how powerful the ads are,” recalled Vernon 
Parker, a Republican who ran in 2014 as a pro-solar candidate and lost at the primary 
stage after facing a flood of attack ads.66 An African American who had previously won 
elections for city council and mayor in the conservative, majority-white town of Paradise 
Valley, Parker described the dark money onslaught as a political challenge of unprecedented 
magnitude. “I wouldn’t wish this on anyone,” he said.67  
News outlets have since reported that a major source of dark money funds likely was the state’s 
largest utility business, Arizona Public Service Company (APS).68 Former commissioner Bill 
Mundell has accused APS of creating a “circle of corruption,” using profits from consumers 
to secretly fund ads to elect candidates who will favor APS over consumers.69 “Who do you 
think those commissioners are going to listen to when there’s a rate case pending? Are they 
going to listen to you or me, or will they listen to the APS executives?” he said at a 2016 
appearance in his campaign to rejoin the commission, according to the Payson Roundup.70
The company has not confirmed or denied funding specific ads.71 In 2014 it responded 
to stories of its alleged dark-money dealings with the general statement that “we routinely 
support public officials, candidates and causes that are pro-business and supportive of a 
sustainable energy future for Arizona,” stressing its “right to participate in the political 
process.”72  The company told the utilities commission in 2013 that it had spent $3.7 million 
on “public relations work” to support a tax on solar households.73 It confirmed one six-figure 
donation to a social welfare nonprofit that donated to a super PAC advertising in the 2012 
elections.74 But, because of gaping loopholes in Arizona’s disclosure laws, it is impossible to 
know the full extent of the company’s election-related activity through official records.  
With the 2014 election, the composition of the five-member commission shifted from a 
majority that backed solar energy to one that had signaled openness to increasing solar’s cost 
to consumers.75	But the commission has been slow to act on the utility company’s requests 
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to levy extra charges on solar consumers, because, according to some observers including one 
commission member, it is now sensitive to accusations of being influenced by dark money.76
Charter Schools and the Los Angeles School Board  
Though the nationwide debate about charter schools involves more than economic issues, it does 
fundamentally involve a tussle over where public education dollars should go. Our review of 
election accounts showed that many school board contests, once low-cost races funded mainly 
by local residents, drew significant amounts of dark money from charter school supporters 
along	with	big	spending	from	opponents	such	as	teachers’	unions.	The	2015	Los	Angeles	school	
board election stands out, not just for the massive amounts of dark money spent in the nation’s 
most expensive school board contest, but also for the spender’s admitted use of one dark-money 
technique: disguising non-local big money behind a local group, the better to woo voters.77
A key operative explained the technique to the Los Angeles Times, after the paper, months after 
the election, reported the true funders of a local PAC called Parent Teacher Alliance in Support of 
Rodriguez,	Galatzan,	and	Vladovic	for	School	Board	2015.78 “Local committees are established 
across the state to give a local flavor to each race, including [a] local name on disclaimers for 
campaign materials,” Richard Garcia, director of elections communications for the California 
Charter Schools Association, said.79 “This is a common practice as campaign consultants believe 
it best to maintain local name ID,” he explained.80 The local group’s name betrayed nothing about 
the original sponsors of its $2.3 million in ads, who included billionaire Michael Bloomberg 
and the family behind Wal-Mart.81 The group’s public contributor reports named only Garcia’s 
statewide PAC, which had received and passed along the original donors’ money.82 One of the 
four open seats went to a pro-charter candidate, the co-founder of a large network of charter 
schools in California.83
B.  Dark Money Targets Ballot Measure Elections
Sometimes more even than candidate elections, state and local ballot measure elections tend to draw heavy 
anonymous spending by economically motivated special interests. The reasons are simple, according to 
Kory Langhofer, an Arizona-based lawyer who advises nonprofits on their political spending: “With ballot 
measures the economic interests are much sharper than with candidate campaigns.”84 Ballot measure 
elections, which do not exist at the federal level, ask voters to directly decide specific questions about 
policies such as taxes, business oversight, and collective bargaining.85 Interest groups can spend tens of 
millions getting precisely the policies they want before voters and then promoting them, a more direct 
route to achieving their goals than lobbying law makers.86  
The reason such spending may be anonymous, Langhofer explained, is that anonymity keeps voters from 
dismissing an ad’s message based on “the financial self-interest of a ballot measure supporter.”87
This shielding effect is arguably good for the political process, said Langhofer, because disclosure 
may cause voters to judge the messenger rather than seriously consider the message, particularly with 
controversial speakers.  
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Federal Election Commissioner Ann Ravel, who as then-chair of the California Fair Political Practices 
Commission	 helmed	 an	 investigation	 into	 $15	 million	 in	 dark	 money	 spent	 on	 two	 2012	 ballot	
measures, disagrees.88 “When it comes to the influence of dark money in a place when the voter is 
sitting as the legislator of the day, the voter is being forced to make a legislative decision with insufficient 
information,” she said.89  
All	50	states	allow	some	form	of	statewide	ballot	measure,	on	everything	from	constitutional	amendments	
to the minimum wage to tax proposals, and all of them also permit local ballot measures.90 The wording 
of these measures can be, notoriously, arcane. Voters might rely to an unusual degree on ads telling 
them how to vote. 
Due to the often high stakes and potential for great influence, business spenders have flocked to ballot 
measure contests. In 2014 at least $200 million in disclosed funding alone for ballot ads came from 
for-profit corporations or business groups, according to a review by the Center for Public Integrity.91 
This	year	political	groups	have	already	raised	more	than	$125	million	as	of	May	in	an	attempt	to	place	
over 800 proposed measures on state ballots — a 74 percent increase from the amount raised for ballot 
measures at the same point in the 2014 election cycle.92
Instances where dark money played a significant role in recent ballot measure elections include: 
Food Labeling in Washington  
In 2013 Washingtonians faced a ballot proposal to require the labeling of genetically modified foods, 
a financially high-stakes measure that prompted record spending.93	The	No	on	522	committee,	
opposing the initiative, amassed the most money ever raised to defeat a Washington ballot initiative, 
more than $22 million.94	This	March	a	county	judge	ruled	that	No	on	522’s	biggest	donor	had	
violated state disclosure laws by concealing the role of numerous household-brand companies, 
including PepsiCo, Nestle, Coca-Cola, Campbell Soup, and Kellogg, in pouring $11 million into 
the effort.95 
Initially, a group called Moms for Labeling had filed a lawsuit demanding disclosure during the 
2013 election battle.96  “The motivation was largely about getting the truth out there during the 
campaign, so that we had a chance of winning,” said Knoll Lowney, an attorney for the group that 
described itself in court papers as “mothers who are harmed by the concealment of the true donors 
of	the	No	on	522	Campaign.”97 A judge dismissed that complaint on procedural grounds.98 The 
state’s attorney general, Bob Ferguson, then took up the fight.
After the long-awaited decision this year, Ferguson told reporters, “This ruling sends an unequivocal 
message: Big money donors cannot evade Washington law and hide from public scrutiny.” 99  
The donor in question, the Washington, D.C.-based Grocery Manufacturers Association 
(GMA),	a	501(c)(6)	 trade	association,	had	 raised	$14	million	 from	high-profile	companies	
for a special “Defense of Brands” account to combat the GMO-labeling initiative.100 These 
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were no mere dues paid by members to support a trade association, Thurston County Superior 
Court Judge Anne Hirsch ruled, but rather donations for a political purpose that should 
have been disclosed to the public as such.101 Though voters might have seen from the GMA 
name that grocery businesses, generally, were behind the ads, GMA’s strategy was to “shield 
individual companies from public disclosure and possible criticism,” according to an internal 
GMA document revealed in the lawsuit.102 Judge Hirsch concluded,“[T]he GMA intentionally 
took steps to create and then hide the true source of the funds in the DOB [Defense of Brands] 
account from the voting public of Washington state.”103  
A poll taken seven weeks before the ballot measure election in 2013 had shown that 66 percent 
of potential voters supported GMO labeling.104 After a barrage of commercials over subsequent 
weeks	opposing	labeling,	though,	51	percent	of	voters	ultimately	rejected	the	measure.105
School Funding in Arizona  
In 2012, the generically named Americans for Responsible Leadership (ARL), a nonprofit 
reported to be funded by the Koch brothers,106 funded more than half the advertising to block 
a citizens’ ballot initiative to maintain a one-cent-per-dollar sales tax that helped fund Arizona’s 
public schools.107 The state legislature had in previous years cut other K-12 education funding 
by nearly one-fifth.108 Anti-initiative ads issued dire warnings: “Prop 204 raises taxes $1 billion 
a year, not to support students but to fund bigger bureaucracy with no education reform. And 
with no guarantee the money will ever reach the classroom.”109
That same year California authorities sued ARL over its secretive spending there, forcing some 
degree of disclosure of ARL’s donors a few days before Arizonans voted on the school-funding 
measure.110 But that disclosure revealed merely a list of other nonprofit groups and PACs.111 
The tax measure was soundly defeated.112 A year later, Arizona’s per-pupil spending ranked 
third-lowest in the nation.113	 By	 2015	more	 than	 40	 of	Arizona’s	 230	 school	 districts	 had	
shrunk the school week to four days, to save on electricity and other basic costs.114
Collective Bargaining in Michigan  
Facing a closely contested 2012 ballot proposal to strengthen collective bargaining rights in 
Michigan, one major employer headquartered in the state, Dow Chemical, gave more than 
$2.5	million	to	groups	that	then	gave	money	to	advertisers	opposing	the	measure,	but	did	not	
disclose its role until the next year.115 With 48 percent of respondents supporting the measure, 
43 percent opposing, and 9 percent undecided, in a poll taken two months before the election, 
it seemed advertising could make all the difference.116 
Opposition ads stoked parental fears, claiming that Proposal 2 “would eliminate safety rules for 
school bus drivers” and “could prohibit schools from removing employees with criminal records.”117 
One ad claimed, “If Proposal 2 passes, teachers caught drunk on the job get five chances.”118 Another 
warned, “Instead of just worrying about our kids’ grades, we’ll have to pray for their safety.”119 The 
advertisements named only “Protecting Michigan Taxpayers” as the sponsor.120
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Dow’s donations came to light only because it voluntarily posted on its website, well after the 
Michigan	 vote,	 contributions	 greater	 than	$50,000	 to	 trade	 associations	 and	 social	welfare	
nonprofits.121 The Center for Public Integrity then reported the posting.122 As with many 
voluntary disclosures, which some large corporations have embraced, it’s not possible to verify 
the accuracy or completeness of the numbers. 
Voters ultimately rejected the measure.123 To be sure, Dow was just one of many funders who 
together gave more than $20 million to oppose the collective bargaining measure, with roughly 
the same amount going to support it — a record in fundraising over a ballot proposal in 
Michigan.124 The multilayered structure of funding that initially hid Dow’s role likely shielded 
other donors on both sides of the measure.
C.  Dark Money Can Dominate Local Contests 
Dark money can be particularly powerful in state and local contests, simply because it is easier in 
lower-cost elections for special interests to dominate the political discourse. In Montana, where a 
typical state legislative campaign can cost less than $20,000, “the effect of dark money can really 
be important,” said Duane Ankney, a Republican state senator who was the primary sponsor of a 
bipartisan	law	enacted	in	2015	to	increase	outside	spending	transparency.125 For many of the contests 
we looked at, a dark money group could have outspent candidates with amounts in the low $100,000s 
or even $10,000s — a modest business expense for special interests, but a major hurdle for many 
candidates and community groups.126 At the federal level, that degree of domination can easily cost 
in the $10 millions.127 On the smaller scale, the power of dark money to mislead voters, intimidate 
or malign candidates, and even discourage would-be candidates and ballot measure advocates, can 
come relatively cheap. 
In California, misleading mailers opposing a local ballot measure to raise taxes on oil companies 
turned out to have been funded by… an oil company, according to a post-election investigation by 
the state’s Fair Political Practices Commission.128 The company, Phillips 66, was based in Texas but 
owned operations in Rialto, California.129 Using the mantle of Californians for Good Schools and 
Good Jobs, the company, secretly spent $38,000 on the 2012 mail campaign.130 The mailers showed 
only the shell organization’s civic-minded name, not the name of the oil company.131 Announcing 
Phillips 66’s agreement to settle the case this year, state officials concluded that the Texas company 
had “misled the voters of Rialto.”132 The order seemed to emphasize the critical difference that the 
mailers may have made in the fairly low-profile contest: it noted that the measure to raise oil company 
taxes	failed	by	just	1,154	votes.133 The $38,000 investment by a company that netted just over $4 
billion in 2012 paid off.134
For candidates used to modest budgets and low-key campaigning, dark money can prove an unfair and 
expensive obstacle, possibly discouraging potential candidates from deciding to compete. “Candidates 
have less control over their own races,” said Herstam, the Arizona lobbyist and former state legislator, 
because of unaccountable, unlimited special interest advertising.135 “Legislative and state candidates 
now realize that more money is likely to be infused in their campaigns by outside expenditures than by 
their actual campaigns, and unfortunately the majority is funded by dark money.”136
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In the traditionally low-cost, low-information city council elections of Mountain View, California, 
candidates recalled, relatively big spending by a secretive group in 2014 had a significant impact. 
The folksy-sounding Neighborhood Empowerment Coalition (NEC) was the biggest spender in the 
election at $83,000, spending more than half of what all nine candidates spent, combined.137 Driving 
issues in the contest included land use and rent control.138 The NEC described itself as “a coalition of 
community members interested in collaborative decision making.” 139 Only after the election did the 
public learn, from NEC’s untimely disclosure filings, that the NEC represented not local residents, as 
the “neighborhood” in its name might suggest, but rather was funded by the state branch PAC of the 
nation’s largest property owners’ association.140   
Candidates were unsettled by the size and secrecy of NEC’s spending. “What makes Mountain View 
distinct,” said City Councilmember Lenny Siegel, “is how inexpensive our campaigns are.”141 Costs 
typically maxed out at $22,000, he said, and candidates campaigned by participating in “public forums, 
and knocking on doors.” But, shortly before Election Day, NEC began to inundate voters with mailers 
supporting three candidates, not mentioning rent control.
The added boost to name recognition alone for the NEC-backed candidates was “a big deal,” said 
Greg Unangst, who ran unsuccessfully for a council seat.142 “In a community like this, most people 
are hardworking and not paying very much attention,” he said. Two of the three candidates the NEC 
supported won.143 “The money [the NEC] spent was effective,” Unangst said. In spite of substantial 
constituent support for rent control, the newly composed city council declined to pursue it.144
The flood of dark money into once low-cost elections has discouraged some otherwise interested 
candidates	from	running.	Last	year	a	15-year	veteran	of	the	school	board	in	Sarasota	County,	Florida,	
announced that he would not run for re-election because of the unprecedentedly large sums involved in 
the previous year’s contest.145 In 2014 a PAC called Citizens Against Taxation, promoting a pro-charter 
schools candidate, had raised $278,000, though state records do not specify how much it spent on the 
race.146	One	contributor	was	an	out-of-state	limited	liability	company	that	gave	$45,000,	according	to	
news reports.147 Citizens Against Taxation donated $10,000 to another group, called Sarasota Citizens 
for Our Schools, that supported the pro-charter candidate.148 A third group, the nonprofit Florida 
Federation for Children, which spent nearly $1.3 million in various state elections, also advertised on 
behalf of that candidate.149	The	four	competitors	for	one	seat	spent	more	than	$135,000	in	total.150
Explaining his decision not to run for re-election in 2016, board veteran Frank Kovach cited the 
influx of outside money into the 2014 contest, telling reporters that the process had been “corrupted 
by cash.”151 “That’s not the way school board races have been,” he said.152 “It has always been closest-
to-the-people kind of races, where you build support financially and otherwise by word of mouth 
and reputation. Historically for school board races, if you raised $10,000 or $12,000, that was a well-
funded school board race. Now all of a sudden you need $100,000 to run for school board.”153
Oklahoma-based political consultant Jennifer Carter said that dark money has changed the nature of 
state campaigns. In 2010 she advised a successful campaign for state schools superintendent in a race 
that	 saw	no	dark	money.	 Four	 years	 later,	 $195,000	 in	 outside	 spending	 by	 a	 nonprofit	 called	
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Oklahomans for Public School Excellence — the sole outside spender — tipped the balance, she believes, 
against her candidate.154 “When thinking about your strategy” these days, she said, “you have to budget 
for the very real possibility that dark money will be spent in your campaign.”155 The lack of accountability, 
more than the amounts, is what troubles her. She said she opposes limits on political money, “but I do 
believe it is important for people to know who is speaking.”156 
The challenge of competing with deep-pocketed anonymous spenders may also be discouraging smaller 
groups from pursuing policy change through a type of ballot measure initiated by gathering voter 
signatures.157 So-called citizens’ initiatives can be costly and complex to get on the ballot, let alone sustain 
against opponents with far greater resources. In Florida, proponents of a renewable-energy initiative this 
year got cold feet once the opposition received millions of dollars from non-disclosing nonprofits as well as 
power companies. “The fact that the utility companies spent $7 million to stop our initiative scared some 
of our donors,” Steven Smith, chair of the Floridians for Solar Choice ballot committee, told Bloomberg 
News. “They may spend $30 million to block it if we got on the ballot,” he said.158   
Even when candidates win, the threat of dark money may influence policy making once the candidate 
is in office. “I believe far too many Republican elected officials are now intimidated by the possibility 
of dark money-backed candidates running against them in their primaries,” said Herstam, the Arizona-
based lobbyist and former lawmaker.159 “That has a very bad effect on public policy making in our state. 
Special interests that make use of dark money in our political campaigns now have an advantage in the 
state capital.”160
Whether or not elected officials are actually influenced by secretive special interests, it is a problem if 
the public perceives that they are, according to Robert Burns, a member of the Arizona public utilities 
commission where elections saw a $3.2 million increase in dark money between 2006 and 2014 after a 
policy	shift	toward	renewable	energy.	In	a	November	2015	public	letter	to	the	utility	company	reported	to	
be behind much of the dark money, Burns criticized the company’s refusal to disclose its political giving. 
“[T]he public appears to look upon the Commission with suspicion and mistrust because of your alleged 
campaign contributions,” he wrote.161 “I understand that you have an interest in supporting candidates 
who may agree with your views. However, in my opinion, your support for any particular candidate 
should be open and transparent. Your unwillingness to disclose this information leads to a variety of 
unfortunate perceptions.”162 
D.  Disclosure Can Make a Difference
It’s not just the relative ease of market-domination by unaccountable interests that is troubling, but 
also that the anonymity breeds a particularly troubling and effective type of advertising. According to 
candidates, political consultants, and social science research, it matters whether an election message can 
be tied to the real messenger.
With dark money ads, “donors get the political benefit of a hit piece, while still protecting their identity,” 
said Andy Billig, a Washington state senator who recently introduced legislation to reduce the practice of 
funneling donations through multiple layers of groups.163 
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Anonymous attack ads are effective, social science research shows, precisely because viewers have little 
information to evaluate besides the content of the ad. When viewers learn more about an ad’s sponsor—
for instance, that it’s an out-of-state group or a group that does not report its donors — they may become 
not only more skeptical about the ad’s message but also more critical of the ad’s intended beneficiary.164 
One political consultant, who advises state candidates in the South and has strategized ad campaigns 
using both transparent and non-disclosing entities, agreed that it is more effective to advertise through 
non-disclosing groups. When he used super PACs, which had to disclose their donors, “people would 
try to label our group as special interests and delegitimize us based on that,” he said.165		“With	a	501(c)
(4), critics don’t know. They have an idea they can attack, but their claims [of special interests] are kind 
of	baseless,”	he	said,	because	there	is	no	public	record	of	who	funds	501(c)(4)	nonprofits,	also	known	as	
social welfare groups. Not a fan of disclosure laws, the consultant urged that anonymity is important for 
business interests that want to engage in politics to advance their goals but “don’t want to see their business 
affected because they are going up against someone in power.”
Ankney, the Republican state senator from Montana, disagrees that businesses’ fear of exposure justifies 
secrecy in election spending. “The voters need to know where this money is coming from, and then they 
need to know what kind of agenda is being pushed. With this dark money, it’s damn sure not an agenda 
being supported by people in the district,” he said.166 “It’s big money trying to rally their troops to get 
legislation passed that don’t have a damn thing to do with the ranchers, the small businessmen, the people 
of this state,” he added. In Montana, critics of dark money have claimed the biggest spending flows from 
out-of-state businesses drawn to the state’s rich natural resources.167 
On occasion a secretive spender actually has been compelled to disclose its backers in advance of Election 
Day, and the information appeared to matter to voters. Relatedly, when special interests have launched ad 
blitzes transparently, disclosing exactly who was backing the ads, voters were unpersuaded by the messages 
even though they far outnumbered any ads by the opposition. Instances where sponsorship information 
appeared to matter to voters include:
Idaho Education Ballot Measure  
In 2012 Idaho voters faced a ballot measure to expand the online component of the state’s high 
school education requirements. A social welfare nonprofit called Education Voters of Idaho 
spent heavily to promote the expansion, but the source of its money was a mystery.168 One week 
before Election Day, acting on a complaint from Republican Secretary of State Ben Ysursa, an 
Idaho court ordered the nonprofit to disclose its donors.169 The disclosure revealed a number of 
nationally known wealthy and out-of-state donors who did not appear to live up to the group’s 
name. It also revealed that Education Voters of Idaho’s biggest funder was an investor who had 
previously profited from online education services.170 News outlets spread the word.
In ordering the disclosure Judge Michael Wetherell wrote, “The voters have a right to the most 
full, most accurate information they can get in spite of money obstacles placed in their way 
by those who would prefer to hide behind catchy, vague names.”171 Invoking an unusual state 
sunshine law, he continued, “The fact that the federal disclosure laws, apparently by omission, 
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create a ‘loophole’ as to reporting requirements for [social welfare nonprofits] through which it 
appears truckloads of millions of dollars drive through, does not bind either the voters of Idaho 
or their legislature.”172 Ultimately, Idahoans voted against putting more public education dollars 
into online systems.173
California Ballot Measures to Raise Taxes and Limit Union Fundraising 
A high-profile investigation by California’s elections agency, beginning in 2012, exposed 
a web of dark money groups that had used shell organizations to try to dodge the state’s 
unusually strong disclosure requirements for millions in advertising about two statewide ballot 
measures.174 The revelation and the great publicity it generated came on the eve of the election, 
in time for voters to react.
Just weeks before the election, a California group called the Small Business Action 
Committee PAC had received $11 million from an undisclosed source.175 The group issued 
ads warning against Proposition 30, which sought to raise personal income and sales taxes, 
and supporting Proposition 32, which sought to limit union fundraising through automatic 
payroll deductions.176 (Ironically one of the group’s ads said that Prop 32 promised “real tough 
campaign finance reform, no loopholes, no exceptions.”)177 A watchdog group, California 
Common Cause, complained about the PAC’s lack of donor disclosure, prompting the 
investigation.178 The probe revealed that the $11 million contribution, the largest anonymous 
donation in California campaign history, came from the Koch brothers-backed Arizona 
nonprofit, Americans for Responsible Leadership.179 But the trail didn’t end there.
Forced by a court order, Americans for Responsible Leadership disclosed that its funding for 
the $11 million contribution to the California PAC had come through two other nonprofit 
organizations: from the Center to Protect Patient Rights, which in turn had received funds 
from the Virginia-based trade association Americans for Job Security.180 Forking off into 
another trail, Americans for Job Security had sent another $7 million through the Center to 
Protect Patient Rights to the American Future Fund, an Iowa-based nonprofit, which then 
gave $4 million to its California affiliate PAC to spend on the ballot contests, bringing the total 
dark	money	uncovered	by	the	state	to	$15	million.181 The investigation made headlines. Voters 
ultimately rejected these spenders’ messages, adopting the tax increase but nixing the limit on 
union fundraising.182
Chevron in Richmond, California, Municipal Elections  
In a cautionary tale brandished by corporate opponents of disclosure, the multinational giant 
Chevron spent more than $3 million in transparent dollars attacking a slate of municipal 
candidates	in	2014	—	dwarfing	combined	spending	by	nine	candidates	by	nearly	5	to	1	—	
only to see straight losses.183 The election focused on Chevron’s compensation to the city of 
Richmond,	California,	after	an	August	2012	fire	at	its	local	refinery	sent	15,000	residents	to	the	
hospital with respiratory problems.184 Richmond’s largest employer and taxpayer, Chevron had 
spent generous sums in previous city elections, but the fire and officials’ responses raised the 
stakes.185  Disparaging a settlement the company had struck with state and county prosecutors 
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in 2013 for $2 million, Richmond officials went to court for more, alleging “years of neglect, 
lax oversight, and corporate indifference to necessary safety inspection and repairs” and a 
“corporate culture which places profits and executive pay over public safety.”186 Chevron called 
the lawsuit “a waste of the city’s resources and yet another example of its failed leadership,” 
according to the San Francisco Chronicle.187
Under California’s unusually robust disclosure laws, Chevron election spending was public 
knowledge.188  It almost singlehandedly funded a trio of political committees that, in the weeks 
before Election Day, launched a blitz of television advertisements, billboards, and mailers, 
averaging roughly $72 per registered voter.189 But a state rule required each communication 
to bear a disclaimer ending with “major funding by Chevron,” among other transparency 
measures.190 Reacting to the ad blitz, one voter told Al Jazeera America, “I not only think it 
turned off voters. I think it inspired voters to come out and take a stand against the attempt 
to buy our elections.”191
Voters rejected all of Chevron’s preferred candidates for mayor and city council in 2014.192 In 
The Richmond Standard, the company wrote, “Chevron has been fully transparent regarding 
our participation in this election . . . . As the city’s largest employer and with such a large 
investment in this city, Chevron chose to participate in the election to make sure its voice was 
heard, and to provide the resources to help voters.”193 Ultimately, as a Chevron spokesman told 
the San Francisco Chronicle, “The voters have spoken.”194
California Ballot Measure to Restrict Regulation of Utilities 
In 2010, Pacific Gas & Electric Co, a private utility company and California’s largest supplier, 
spent $46 million on television, radio, print, and mailed ads promoting a ballot measure to 
limit the power of local governments to create public utilities.195 The company’s role was out in 
the open, because California law requires that political ads contain a disclaimer identifying the 
sponsor.196	Thus,	one	television	ad	claiming	that	“politicians	want	$2.5	billion	in	public	funds	
to pay for government-run electricity without voter approval” ended with the text: “Major 
funding from Pacific Gas and Electric Company.”197 Though opponents raised just $90,000 to 
counter the company’s $46 million in ads, voters still rejected the ballot measure that would 
have protected the ads’ sponsor from competition and restricted consumer choice.198
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WHAT SHOULD BE DONE
Voters	want	more	 transparency.	A	November	2015	poll	by	 the	Associated	Press	 showed	76	percent	
of respondents agreeing that “all groups that raise and spend unlimited money to support candidates 
should be required to publicly disclose their contributors,” with 87 percent believing that disclosure 
would be at least somewhat effective at reducing the influence of money in politics.199 Moreover, even 
while it has steadily dismantled other campaign finance laws, the Supreme Court has consistently 
upheld disclosure measures.200 
Increasing transparency will not be easy. The sheer numbers and variety of vehicles for dark money 
will challenge the most robust rules and toughest enforcer. As long as artificial entities enjoy unlimited 
fundraising and spending power under the law, anonymous political advertising will continue to 
pose a significant risk of misleading voters, unfairly attacking and even discouraging candidates, and, 
whether as carrot or stick, unduly influencing the decisions of elected representatives. But while many 
work toward achieving a course correction at the Supreme Court, certain reforms are likely to make a 
measurable difference in achieving transparency.
Recently, a growing number of jurisdictions have shown that it is possible to take concrete steps against 
dark money. When it comes to reform, the very scale that enables dark money to have an outsize 
effect at the state level can also be an asset, enabling relatively quick action compared to at the federal 
level. Jonathan Motl, Montana’s top enforcer of campaign finance laws as its commissioner of political 
practices, pointed out that dark money was able to have a “profound effect” in the state because of 
its relatively small political arena.201 “But that’s also why we’re able to take quick action” to enact a 
legislative	response,	he	said.	In	2015,	a	bipartisan	coalition	of	Montana	legislators	enacted	a	sweeping	
set of transparency laws, with members of both major parties disgusted by the influx of out-of-state dark 
money into primaries and general elections in 2012 and 2014.202  Even a politically much larger state, 
California, has shown that strong disclosure laws and vigorous enforcement can result in remarkably 
low amounts of dark money, as our analysis of spending data in Section One indicated. 
Our review of the major loopholes and recent efforts to close them yields a clear set of recommendations 
for reasonably and effectively improving transparency.  In general, most longstanding regimes require 
disclosure of donors only by registered political committees or in other limited circumstances that 
minimally sophisticated donors and spenders can too easily dodge.  This approach fails to capture 
how outside spending actually occurs in the post-Citizens United era.  A modern and more effective 
approach should do the following:
Close loopholes that allow nonprofits to keep donors secret even when they spend money 
on politics.
•	 Require disclosure by all groups that spend a substantial amount of money on politics.
Currently the sources of huge swaths of political spending can remain anonymous because most 
jurisdictions require disclosure of all donors only for groups that register with the government 
III. 
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as political committees, which typically is required only if a group’s primary purpose is deemed 
to be political.203 Other groups can avoid disclosure by claiming to have another primary 
purpose, such as to promote social welfare, even as they take and spend sizeable sums for 
electoral advocacy.
Two states recently enacted reforms to close this loophole. Changes in California 
and Montana recognize that groups may give or spend substantial amounts of money 
for election advertising, even if that’s not their primary purpose, and that the public 
should know as much about these groups’ political funding as about full-blown political 
committees’.204 Both states’ laws apply explicitly to the types of nonprofit groups — social 
welfare organizations and trade associations — that are notorious conduits for anonymous 
electioneering.205
•	 Require disclosure of both express advocacy ads and issue ads that mention candidates.
Fifteen states require outside spenders to disclose only their spending on “express advocacy” 
communications — ads that specifically urge their audience to vote for or against a 
candidate.206 But this narrow category of ads encompasses only a fraction of independent 
spending. More common are so-called electioneering communications, or issue ads that 
attack or praise candidates in the guise of addressing an issue during election season but 
stop short of express advocacy. In these states, advertisers can easily dodge disclosure 
simply by avoiding the use of certain words. Moreover, some states require disclosure only 
of the fact that an entity spent on an election-related ad, no matter how explicitly political, 
not of where the entity got the money to spend.207
Federal law, recognizing the reality of election-season issue ads, requires advertisers to 
disclose spending and funding for any ad that names a candidate during election season 
— 60 days before a general election and 30 days before a primary election — and targets 
potential voters.208 Compliance with the donor disclosure requirement, however, is 
minimal, because of a loophole in the current interpretation of the law.209 A pending bill 
would extend the disclosure period to the entire year of an election.210 It will be crucial to 
identify a period long enough to capture most communications intended to influence an 
election, but not so long as to capture other issue advocacy unconnected to an upcoming 
election.
•	 Require disclosure of donors to political spending even if they don’t “earmark” their 
contributions.
Delaware and Montana recently embraced the federal model and now require outside 
spenders to disclose funding sources for issue ads that are actually electioneering 
communications.211 Delaware now requires disclosure of all donors to groups that buy 
these types of ads.212 Montana’s law is more limited and requires disclosure only of donors 
who earmark their contributions for the electioneering ad in question, an approach that 
some states and to some extent the federal government already follow.213
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Requiring disclosure only of earmarked contributions poses some risk of evasion, by 
spenders or donors who take care to keep fundraising solicitations and contributions 
unspecified while still intending the money for election ads. In 2014, California enacted a 
novel approach to closing this potential loophole. The reform requires a spender to disclose 
enough contributions to account for all of its political advertising in a given cycle, even if 
the spender claims that not all the contributors gave specifically for those ads. The spender 
cannot go back in time and disclose long-ago contributors — which could help to conceal 
the true interests behind currently relevant ads — but rather must report the contributions 
made closest in time to the ads in question.214 
Ensure that voters and regulators know who is really behind the spending. 
•	 Extend disclosure to organizations that donate to spender organizations.
Often when a transparent spender such as a PAC discloses its donors, a substantial amount 
of reported contributions come from entities that themselves received donations but do 
not have to disclose their donors. The spender is able to appear transparent, but voters 
cannot know the true source of the money spent. Campaign finance reformers sometimes 
refer to this problem as the “Russian nesting doll” problem — because the identity of the 
original donor may be nested within multiple organizations — or as the “covered transfer” 
problem, to describe funds raised by one organization but passed on for election spending 
to another organization. 
States should require disclosure of the donors underlying these so-called “covered transfers.” 
Under California’s 2014 law, for example, even nonprofits must disclose the donors 
underlying any covered transfers to organizations that engage in outside spending.215 A 
pending bill in Missouri would require not only outside spenders to disclose their donors, 
but also require the same disclosure of donors to that spender, donors to the first-level 
donor, and donors to the second-level donor.216 A bill introduced in Washington state 
attempts to limit covered transfers in the first place, by prohibiting a political committee 
from receiving more than 70 percent of its funds from any other political committee.217 
To be sure, even if multiple layers of organizations must disclose their donors, voters 
may still have a tough time piercing all those layers to identify the original source of the 
money. This is what we have called the gray money problem. One solution would be a 
requirement that the outside spender report all of the lower layers of contributions in 
its own filings — putting the onus on the spender, rather than on the general public. 
Connecticut, for example, requires a spender to list the names of its own contributors, as 
well as the five biggest contributors to any of its donors that themselves receive covered 
transfers.218  California requires outside spenders to list the top two donors who gave at 
least	$50,000.219 In any case, election ad funding that is ultimately disclosed, even several 
layers down, is better than funding that remains secret.
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•	 Require disclosure of the people in charge of opaque spending entities. 
Campaign finance disclosures often list artificial entities — nonprofit corporations or limited liability 
companies, for instance — as spenders or contributors. There is no requirement that the names of 
these entities reflect their actual purpose or interests, and many use generic or even misleading names 
that obscure the nature of their funding. The widespread use of artificial entities to spend and donate 
election ad money risks robbing the public of any meaningful benefit from disclosure laws. 
 
Some states and localities are already addressing this problem. Delaware’s new law requires entity 
contributors to provide “one responsible party” for the entity.220 Similarly, 2014 amendments 
to the New York City charter require that entities contributing to organizations engaging in 
outside spending disclose “at least one individual who exercises control over the activities of such 
contributing entity controlling party.”221 Such reforms should make it easier for voters, regulators, 
journalists, and other members of the public to know who is really funding a particular ad. 
Require disclosure before Election Day.
Some states’ disclosure schedules allow significant gaps between campaign spending and reporting, in 
some cases leaving the sources of major election spending undisclosed until just before or even well after 
voters have cast their ballots.222 Belated disclosures, though better for accountability than no disclosure 
at all, risk depriving voters of crucial information about who is seeking to influence them in time for 
voters to act on that information.
The new disclosure laws in Montana and Delaware require additional reporting before an election, 
including more frequent reporting by groups that sponsor election ads even if their primary purpose 
is not political.223 Both states also extended the pre-election period during which accelerated reporting 
of large expenditures is required.224 A pending federal bill seeks to make all outside spenders, including 
super PACs and politically active nonprofit groups, disclose their major donors more frequently as their 
spending increases, rather than on a fixed schedule.225
States can also require spenders to disclose their top contributors in their advertisements themselves, 
informing voters in real time. Washington state requires political advertisers to identify their top 
five contributors in either a text or spoken disclaimer.226 Connecticut has a similar requirement and 
further requires that if any of the donors listed in that disclaimer are recipients of covered transfers, the 
underlying donors making those transfers must be listed in the spender’s filings.227
Include reasonable accommodations that ensure disclosure rules are not overly 
burdensome.
The goals of disclosure are to deter corruption and inform the voting public, not to chill political 
speech. Donors and spenders should not have to face unduly burdensome requirements. Yet this year 
in Arizona anti-disclosure voices took any legitimate concerns to the extreme in gutting the state’s 
law to exempt most nonprofit groups from state disclosure requirements, seemingly ignoring that 
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transparency has long been a part of American democracy.228 As the late Justice Antonin Scalia wrote, 
agreeing in a 2010 decision to uphold disclosure of signatures on a voters’ petition to create a ballot 
measure, “[R]equiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without 
which democracy is doomed.”229 Well-crafted rules can ensure meaningful disclosure of big money 
without sacrificing political speech or legitimate privacy needs. Potential accommodations include:
•	 Set reasonable monetary thresholds.
In some cases, extensive disclosure requirements may risk hindering participation by some 
spenders. Ad hoc community groups, for instance, may lack the resources or expertise to 
readily comply, and potential small donors may be discouraged by the possibility of outsize 
consequences — for instance, adverse action by a disapproving employer — for modest 
contributions.230 Moreover, small contributions and expenditures do not raise the risks of 
corruption or distorting influence that disclosure laws ideally serve to mitigate.231 Setting 
reasonable dollar thresholds at which spenders must disclose, and at which donors must be 
made public, balances the need to achieve transparency at levels of spending that pose a risk 
to democracy with the desire to ease political participation for under-resourced speakers.
The level of a reasonable threshold will, of course, vary by jurisdiction. In Illinois, entities 
need to report their outside spending only if they spend at least $3,000 in a 12-month 
period.232 And outside spenders in Georgia do not have to disclose donors of $1,000 or less 
in their pre-election reports.233 Both of these thresholds are significantly higher than the 
$250	threshold	for	disclosure	in	several	other	states,	yet	likely	do	not	increase	the	risk	to	the	
political process.234 While $3,000 and $1,000 thresholds may be appropriate for statewide 
races in Illinois and Georgia, they may be too high to capture even major spending in local 
races in many states.  
•	 Permit reasonable exemptions.
For certain vulnerable participants, the publicity associated with disclosure as a donor 
could risk real harm. Survivors of domestic violence and similarly situated individuals 
may have a reasonable basis to fear the standard disclosure of name, address, and employer 
for political donors. Disclosure is also not appropriate when there is evidence that past 
disclosure exposed a group’s members to severe retaliation such as “loss of employment, 
threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility,” as with the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in the Jim Crow South.235 
Carefully drawn exemptions can protect these individuals’ demonstrated need for privacy 
without meaningfully reducing the anticorruption or informational value of disclosure by 
others. Thirty-five states currently provide confidentiality-protecting measures for survivors 
of domestic violence who would otherwise be expected to provide their home address 
to government agencies.236 These programs apply to applications for voter registration, 
drivers’ licenses, and campaign finance disclosure. 237  
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•	 Make other reasonable accommodations.
States should avoid capturing non-political spending in their campaign finance disclosure laws. 
As under California’s recent reforms, individual donors should be able to expressly prohibit a 
recipient organization from using their money for political purposes and thus avoid having to 
be disclosed.238 Jurisdictions can also enable spenders whose primary purpose is not political 
to establish separate accounts exclusively for political spending, subjecting only those funds to 
disclosure. The DISCLOSE Act of 2010 called these Campaign-Related Activity Accounts, 
and as of 2013 Connecticut allows for the creation of dedicated independent expenditure 
accounts.239 For multipurpose organizations that do not separate their political spending, 
disclosure laws should still prioritize publicizing the information that is most valuable to voters. 
For instance, California requires nonprofits that have spent on a particular election ad to 
disclose donors who gave closest to the time of the spending, as these donors are most likely to 
have given to support that political spending.240 This approach absolves groups with significant 
non-political income and expenses from having to reveal all of their financial activity. 
•	 Make penalties proportional.
Any penalty for failure to disclose should fit the severity of the violation. Small or technical 
lapses should not face onerous adjudication procedures or big fines, and any penalties should 
be predictable.241 Recognizing the need for proportionality, in 2000 the Federal Election 
Commission created a separate enforcement track for minor violations such as failure to 
disclose small-dollar campaign finance activities. Previously, these matters had gone through 
the same, extensive enforcement process as more serious violations.242 Proportional and 
predictable compliance enforcement can minimize any burdens on speech while still deterring 
intentional violations.
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CONCLUSION: WHERE TO LOOk FOR DARk MONEy IN FUTURE ELECTIONS
The problem is not that dark money will flood every state and local election or even most. Rather, it’s 
that dark money is most likely to turn up where the stakes are particularly valuable, in amounts that 
could make all the difference in persuading voters. Our review offers a number of indicators for when 
voters may see significant dark money and for figuring out who may be behind it.
Elections for offices that hold specific regulatory or enforcement powers with economic consequences 
are likely targets for dark money. Those elections may be for utilities regulator or school official or state 
judge. But they may also be for legislative seats in states or towns where the pressing questions of the 
day affect specific economic interests, such as whether to speed up development of natural resources or 
sue oil companies for environmental damage.
With many areas considered to be “safe” in terms of voter partisanship, the real contest may be at the 
primary stage. Motl, the Montana elections regulator, said that in his state, “The traditional place for 
undisclosed spending has been in Republican primary elections in which a more conservative candidate 
gets	outside	 support”	—	one	 reason	why	 the	 state’s	2015	disclosure	 reform	 law	 received	bipartisan	
support. Similarly, voters in the utilities commission elections in Arizona, a solidly Republican state, 
have seen most of the millions in dark money ads spent before the primary. 
Ballot measure elections with economic consequences for deep-pocketed interests are also likely to 
draw dark money. Observers agree that it is too early to know exactly which measures voters will see 
this year, as ballot questions are not finalized until later. But Thomas Collins, executive director of the 
Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission, says measures having to do with the minimum wage 
and political spending disclosure are already on the radar in his state. “The spectrum suggests that there 
will be a lot of money spent and not a lot of it will be disclosed,” Collins said. 
As for where the dark money will come from, the good guesses can sometimes be obvious. It can be 
as simple as identifying who holds the big ownership interests in line to be affected: The chemicals 
manufacturer and the state ballot measure on collective bargaining where the manufacturer is 
headquartered. The oil company and the local ballot measure to raise taxes on oil companies. The 
gas company and the local elections in a state where the company stands accused by local officials of 
damaging the environment. 
It also makes sense to wonder who or what is behind the biggest outside spending in a given contest — 
behind the TV ad blitzes and mountains of mailers — as it is simply so easy for well-resourced interests 
to dominate advertising in smaller contests through benignly-named entities. Moreover, with more 
dark money appearing in the guise of seemingly transparent PAC spending, via donations funneled 
through multiple groups, it is worth scrutinizing even PACs for their actual sponsors. The oil company 
fighting the local tax measure in Rialto disguised its outsized spending on mailers through a shell PAC 
claiming to care about education.
Areas with weak disclosure laws and enforcement are open country for dark money spenders. Collins, 
the Arizona official, said that the state’s enormous spike in dark money in 2014 in part reflected spenders’ 
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taking advantage of regulatory confusion following legislative efforts to cut back state oversight of 
nonprofits’ political activity. Those efforts also caused “trepidation on the part of those responsible 
for enforcement,” he said. By contrast, California, a robust disclosure law and enforcement state, saw 
Chevron spend $3 million in a small municipal election, but transparently. 
To be sure, strong rules and enforcement are not sufficient to end the tide of unlimited, unaccountable 
spending in an era where artificial entities are free to raise and spend whatever they like on politics. 
A fundamental change in campaign finance law, based on a pro-democracy interpretation of the 
Constitution, is required. But smart rules and real consequences that incentivize compliance can make 
a real difference in providing voters information that matters to their decisions and in keeping elected 
officials accountable to the public. 
Where disclosures laws are weak and “as long as Citizens United isn’t overturned,” said Herstam, the 
former Arizona legislator, “the wealthy donors further solidify their power and maintain their corrupt 
influence for years to come.”
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AppENDIx: METHODOLOGy 
Below we explain our approach to the research and conclusions reflected in this report. 
For the accounts of particular candidate or ballot measure contests, we drew from a set we compiled 
of	approximately	50	instances	since	2010	where	dark	money	could	be	linked	to	a	particular	type	of,	
or an exact, sponsor. We began with a comprehensive scan of news databases for relevant accounts, 
finding most mentions in reporting by state or local news outlets. We further researched many of these 
instances, through review of campaign finance, tax, and/or court records where possible and through 
interviews of stakeholders. 
For the analysis of outside election spending in six states from 2006 through 2014, we used data gathered 
by the National Institute for Money in State Politics (NIMSP), a nonpartisan research organization that 
maintains a verifiable database of campaign finance spending.243 This analysis would not have been possible 
without NIMSP’s efforts and expertise. We also consulted hundreds of state campaign finance filings, state 
corporate	registration	forms,	federal	tax	returns,	and	federal	527	disclosure	reports.244 
We selected the first six states in alphabetical order of nine that (1) held statewide elections in 2006, 2010 
(the year of the Citizens United decision) and 2014; (2) supplied verifiable data compiled by NIMSP; and 
(3) tracked outside spending (also known as independent expenditures) on both political ads expressly 
calling for a candidate’s election or defeat and also ads mentioning candidates in connection with issues.245 
States that do not track candidate-related issue advertising, also known as electioneering communications, 
ignore an enormous amount of real-world spending and thus were not worth selecting for review. 246 
Analyzing the tens of thousands of disclosure reports by spenders and their contributors in all nine states 
was not feasible in the time we had. Thus, we stopped at six states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Maine, and Massachusetts.  
Of course the significance of our analysis is limited by the small though objectively-selected sample. But it 
is also worth noting that the data we reviewed for our empirical analysis excluded ballot measure spending, 
keeping our analysis in line with federal analyses where there are no ballot measures but likely excluding 
huge amounts of dark money based on the anecdotal evidence we gathered. Moreover, our calculations 
risked undercounting amounts of dark money, as will be further discussed below. Overall our findings, all 
adjusted for inflation, provide a conservative picture of any increases in dark money in the states.  
In each state and election we analyzed, we counted spending by individuals, for-profit businesses, and 
labor organizations as transparent, because the interests behind these entities are usually apparent and 
because labor organizations are subject to extensive and public donor disclosure requirements by the U.S. 
Department of Labor.247	In	each	state	except	California,	we	counted	most	spending	by	501(c)(3),	(4)	and	
(6) groups as dark, because in the other five states these entities are not legally required to disclose their 
donors, and we have found that they rarely do so voluntarily. If a state required normally non-disclosing 
nonprofits nevertheless to disclose any donor who contributed specifically for the purpose of supporting 
an election-related communication, and a nonprofit actually disclosed a donor under that requirement, 
we did not treat the relevant spending as dark but rather evaluated its transparency on its own merits.248 
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Seeking to understand whether disclosures by transparent outside spenders such as political action 
committees provided the public meaningful information about the source of funding, we also analyzed 
for transparency all but the smallest donors to each PAC that spent in an election cycle.249   As with our 
classifications of reported spending, we classified as “transparent” any contributions to these PACs by 
individuals, for-profit businesses, or labor organizations. We classified as “dark” any contributions to 
these	PACs	by	donors,	such	as	501(c)(4)	nonprofits,	that	were	not	themselves	subject	to	disclosure.	We	
classified as “gray” any contributions to these PACs by donors that themselves received contributions 
and were subject to disclosure, making it perhaps possible but not at all straightforward to identify the 
ultimate source of the money spent. Most often, this is money transferred from one PAC to another 
PAC. Whenever the total contributions to a PAC we analyzed exceeded the total spending reported by 
that PAC for a given cycle, we applied the proportions of transparent, dark, and/or gray contributions 
to the total amount of spending.
Our approach to analyzing the transparency of outside spending closely follows that of several 
other nonpartisan organizations that have undertaken significant efforts to quantify dark money at 
the federal level, including the Center for Responsive Politics and the Sunlight Foundation.250  We 
deviated from these organizations’ approaches in a few respects, as explained below, both to address 
particular challenges of studying state-level election spending and to provide a more detailed picture of 
transparency across the country.
•	 Analyses of federal spending have distinguished businesses with a genuine commercial purpose 
from so-called “shells,” organized as for-profit companies but whose real purpose is to engage 
in political activity.  Our analysis considers all businesses to be transparent, because, unlike 
with the smaller set of spenders at the federal level, it was not feasible to individually investigate 
the purpose of the many thousands of business spenders in our data set.  Had we done so, the 
amount of dark money we uncovered likely would have been much greater.
•	 Accounts of federal spending have also investigated whether a politically active group that 
is not legally required to disclose has done so voluntarily. We did not try to account for any 
voluntary disclosures by such groups, in part because the number of nonprofits across our 
six states would not have been feasible to investigate individually. Voluntary disclosure is also 
not one of our recommendations for ensuring election spending transparency, as there is no 
reliable way to ensure that it is accurate.  Moreover, according to the Center for Responsive 
Politics, voluntary disclosure is exceedingly rare.251 We believe that accounting for voluntary 
disclosure would have had little to no impact on our findings.
•	 For the most part federal spending studies have not investigated spenders’ disclosures to assess 
whether they provided true transparency or rather disclosed still other entities that themselves 
took money from donors, raising the problem of gray money.252
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